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1. Introduction  
Institutional investors constitute by far the most dominant investor group in contemporary 
financial markets, accounting for the bulk of the market capitalization and trading volume of 
the latter (Choi and Sias, 2009; Stambaugh, 2014). Although their sophisticated nature would 
presume the prevalence of rationality in their trades, international evidence suggests their 
particular susceptibility to behaviourally biased trading patterns1, the most widely documented 
of those being herding.2 Extant research has denoted the importance of several rational factors 
underlying the propensity of institutional investors to herd, including informational 
asymmetries (Gelos and Wei, 2005; Choi and Skiba, 2015), career concerns (Holmes et al., 
2013; Jiao and Ye, 2014), style investing (Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009; Celiker et al., 2015) 
and their regulatory framework (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), to mention but a few. However, 
the effect of mood (a less-than-perfectly rational factor) over institutional herding has not been 
investigated to date despite the recent surge in research (Goetzmann et al., 2015; Kaustia and 
Rantapuska, 2016) on mood’s impact over the trading behaviour of institutional investors and 
it is this issue that this study aims at addressing.  
More specifically, we investigate the relationship between mood and institutional herding in 
the context of the Turkish equity market drawing on a unique database of daily portfolio 
holdings of the market’s domestic funds. Utilizing various established mood proxies (weekend 
effect; holidays; Ramadan; sunshine) this research addresses two specific issues. First, we 
examine whether various mood states are related to the presence of institutional herding (i.e. 
its statistical significance), in general. Second, in view of literature evidence (Kamstra et al., 
2003) on the propensity of mood to affect the direction of investors’ trades, we assess whether 
                                                            
1 Such as momentum trading (Choi and Skiba, 2015) and the disposition effect (Jin and Scherbina, 2011). 
2 See e.g. the recent global empirical evidence by Choi and Skiba (2015). 
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these mood states are associated with the direction of institutional herding (i.e. whether it is 
buy- or sell-herding that is observed during their occurrence). 
Overall, we produce results showcasing the presence of significant herding among Turkish 
fund managers whose magnitude increases with the number of active funds per stock and which 
appears stronger on the buy- than the sell-side. As regards the relationship between mood and 
institutional herding presence, our results confirm it is insignificant. We report evidence in 
support of funds herding more on Mondays, during Ramadan and on days of decreased 
sunshine, without however that herding being significantly different from that manifested on 
Fridays, outside Ramadan and on days of increased sunshine, respectively; results further 
suggest the presence of some pre holiday herding.  
Turning now to the relationship between mood and institutional herding direction, we find 
Ramadan-days presenting us with evidence of buy-herding only (which - for those cases when 
it is present - is always stronger, compared to that of non-Ramadan days), while sell-herding 
appears exclusively present outside Ramadan. What is more, buy- (sell-) herding is stronger on 
increased (decreased) sunshine days; buy-herding appears stronger compared to sell-herding 
on increased sunshine days, while decreased sunshine days present us with no consistent 
pattern on whether it is buy- or sell-herding that is stronger for them. Evidence of buy-herding 
for Mondays and Fridays is rather limited (surfacing relatively more on Mondays than Fridays), 
with its magnitude being larger for Mondays compared to Mondays’ sell-herding (for those 
cases where both buy- and sell-herding are significant on Mondays). Conversely, sell-herding 
appears consistently present on Fridays and always stronger than sell-herding on Mondays 
(when the latter is present). However, aside from a few exceptions (identified mainly with some 
significant herding differences between Mondays and Fridays) most differences in both buy- 
and sell-herding are statistically insignificant for various mood states, indicating that mood 
bears no significant relation to institutional herding direction. 
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We further test for the robustness of our results by performing a series of tests. First, we repeat 
all estimations excluding tracker funds (whose trades are, by definition, motivated by 
benchmark-tracking) from the sample and report results near-identical to those from the full-
sample estimations. Second, we control for possible size effects by sorting stocks in quintiles 
based on previous-year market capitalization rankings; results again indicate that institutional 
herding is insignificantly different across various mood states irrespective of stock-size (and 
appearing the least strong for stocks of the lowest capitalization).      
Our work contributes significantly to behavioural finance research in distinct ways. To begin 
with, it assesses the relationship between mood and institutional herding for the first time in 
the literature and produces evidence suggesting that this relationship is insignificant, thus 
denoting that mood states do not significantly bias the propensity of sophisticated investors to 
herd. Compared to extant research on mood effects over institutional trading behaviour, the 
evidence we present in this study is in line with the findings reported by Kaustia and 
Rantapuska (2016) on the weak effect of weather-related mood proxies over the trading 
behaviour of institutional investors in Finland, yet runs counter to Goetzmann et al. (2015) who 
find that cloud cover affects mispricing perceptions and trading decisions of US fund managers. 
Second, our findings suggest that the pursuit of a behaviourally biased trading pattern (in our 
case, herding) by fund managers does not necessarily render them susceptible to mood effects 
in their trading. Third, given that mood as a factor is far from strictly rational, we contribute to 
the research on the effect of less-than-perfectly rational factors over market herding in general 
(Chang and Lin, 2015; Eun et al., 2015), and institutional herding in particular (Beckmann et 
al., 2008; Liao et al., 2011; Celiker et al., 2015).3  
                                                            
3 Although earlier research (Gavriilidis et al., 2016) explored the role of social mood (proxied via Ramadan) in 
market-wide herding, no research exists on the link between mood per se and institutional herding. 
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Our study bears important implications for researchers, as it highlights the need for a more 
comprehensive investigation of the relationship between mood and institutional herding at a 
wider cross market level internationally, in order to establish whether it reveals any patterns 
and whether it varies among markets at different stages of financial development. It would be 
interesting, for example, to gauge whether mood-factors common to several countries (such as, 
for example, the Ramadan month in majority Muslim countries) produce similar effects over 
their funds’ herding. Another possibility would be to investigate whether, herding aside, mood 
is related to other behavioural investment patterns popular among fund managers, such as 
momentum trading (Choi and Skiba, 2015). As far as the wider investment community is 
concerned, the emergence of any mood-related patterns in the herding of fund managers would 
suggest the potential for those patterns motivating ad hoc trading strategies. If, for example, a 
significant relationship between a weather mood-proxy (e.g. sunshine) and institutional herding 
were to be established, one could trade in/against the anticipated direction of funds’ herding 
given that proxy’s forecasts while at the same time hedge their position via weather derivatives 
(whose popularity as hedging instruments since the mid-1990s would render such a strategy 
theoretically feasible; see, for example, Pérez-González and Yun, 2013).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview of herd behaviour 
and its key sources (section 2.1), introduces mood as a concept (section 2.2) and discusses the 
theoretical relationship between herding and mood (section 2.3). Section 3 presents the dataset 
utilized (section 3.1) and outlines the empirical design employed, alongside a discussion of the 
mood-proxies controlled for (section 3.2). Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 
concludes. 




From a conceptual perspective, herding refers to the situation whereby investors exhibit 
similarity in their behaviour following interactive observation of each other’s actions or action-
payoffs, while at the same time sidelining their private information or fundamentals 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Institutional herding can give rise to issues regarding funds’ 
portfolio structures, in terms of the efficiency of their allocation and their congruence to their 
clients’ risk preferences (Economou et al., 2015), in effect raising the possibility of moral 
hazard in their industry. What is more, the dominance of institutional investors in modern 
financial markets and the increasingly globalized financial environment in which they operate 
imply that any herding on their behalf is capable of fomenting new and exacerbating existing 
financial episodes, both within and across markets, thus contributing to systemic risk. As a 
general observation, institutional herding is widely documented internationally (Choi and 
Skiba, 2015), with research (Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013) suggesting that fund 
managers herd either intentionally (in anticipation of a benefit) or spuriously (due to a common 
factor fostering correlation in their trades). Fund managers herd intentionally as a response to 
(actual or perceived) asymmetries in the market environment which prompt some of them to 
view themselves as disadvantaged; in this case, mimicking the behaviour of their (“better”) 
peers offers them the opportunity to improve their position. Such asymmetries could be 
informational (managers whose quality of information or information processing skills are low, 
are tempted to track the trades of their better informed peers in order to free ride on their 
information; Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992) as well as reputational (less 
able/reputed investment professionals may choose to mimic their better-quality peers to 
improve their professional image and ensure that their low quality is not detected; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990).4 On the other hand, fund managers herd spuriously when their trades exhibit 
                                                            
4 This is particularly important during down markets, since the higher likelihood of losses during the latter entails 
graver professional implications for fund managers. Should a “bad” manager choose to mimic a “good” one’s 
trades during a down market period, he could claim his trading decisions were prudent (they would tally with 
those of “good” managers) and attribute any losses to the prevailing adverse market conditions. Reputational 
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similarity due to the influence of a common factor to which they are all exposed, without 
interactive observation among them being present. Key to spurious herding is relative 
homogeneity, the latter referring to features common among managers which lead to 
similarities in their decisions (De Bondt and Teh, 1997); such features can include, for example, 
the similar educational backgrounds and professional qualifications of most fund managers, 
the similarities in the selection and processing of micro/macro indicators (Wermers, 1999) and 
their regulatory framework (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Blake et al., 2017). Spurious herding 
can also be motivated via style investing (“characteristic trading”; Sias, 2004), the latter 
referring to strategies involving stock selection based on specific stock characteristics, such as 
past performance, value and industry. Style investing is particularly popular among 
institutional investors and, if a sufficiently large number of them follow a given style, this can 
lead them to trade similarly, generating the impression of them herding. 
 
2.2 Mood 
Conceptually, mood constitutes a pre rational state of affective content experienced internally 
by an individual and motivated by both exogenous (e.g. environmental conditions), as well as 
endogenous (such as a person’s earlier emotional experiences) factors (Frijda, 1993). Mood-
states can be both global (e.g. positive versus negative mood) as well as specific (e.g. euphoria 
versus anger) and are of a transient nature, thus constituting short-lived phenomena (Frijda, 
1993) with no conscientious cognitive effort mediating their appearance and evolution. Mood 
can be perceived individually (a person who has just lost a loved one will experience feelings 
of loss) as well as collectively (a natural disaster befalling a city will induce negative emotions 
                                                            
considerations, can, however, promote similar behaviour during market upswings as well, since underperforming 
during up markets would only help cast a professional stigma over a “bad” manager.   
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to its inhabitants). The impact of mood can be felt in various cognitive functions, including 
attention, encoding of information, forecasting, memory, motivation and perception, thus being 
expected to be present in individuals’ judgement-formation and decision-making (Isen, 2000). 
The onset of a given mood tends to prompt mood-congruent cognitive processes and decisions 
(Schwarz, 2002); a person in a positive mood is likely to view the world as a better place (a 
person with negative mood will probably not) and a happy (sad) person will be more (less) 
likely to enter risky decisions.  
In the context of financial markets, mood has been associated with the promotion of mood-
congruent perceptions of risk and direction of investors’ trades. Positive mood tends to reduce 
an investment’s perceived riskiness, prompting people to be less averse towards engaging in it 
and rendering them more likely to resort to heuristics in its analysis (its lower perceived 
riskiness reduces the necessity for analytical processing; Schwarz, 1990, Forgas, 1998), with 
people in a negative mood tending to view investments as riskier than they actually are and 
devoting more time in trying to detect their possible pitfalls (Schwarz, 2002). Therefore, 
investors in a positive (negative) state of mood would be expected to be more (less) 
overconfident (Au et al., 2003), engage in more (less) risk-seeking behaviour (Forgas, 1995; 
Isen, 2000; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; Bassi et al., 2013) and view equity investing as an 
opportunity (a threat), thus being more likely to buy (sell) stocks (Mittal and Ross, 1998).5 
Drawing on a wide array of mood-proxies, including sunshine (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 
2003), temperature (Cao and Wei, 2005), biorhythms (Kamstra et al., 2003), holidays (Meneu 
                                                            
5 A term often used interchangeably with mood (despite it not entailing the same content) is “sentiment” (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2007); the latter pertains to extrapolative beliefs about future cash flows and risks, based on the 
perception of a trend being at works (e.g. that an up/downward trend in earnings will persist). Unlike mood, 
sentiment is “fundamentals-plus”, in the sense that the beliefs underlying it are founded on existing fundamentals 
which are then extrapolated upon to project future trends. Furthermore, unlike mood, sentiment involves cognitive 
effort (its formulation merits some processing of the information available) and tends to be of longer duration (as 
it relates to wider market trends). Additionally, whereas mood bears no causal relationship to economic/financial 
indicators (stock returns, for example, do not cause changes in sunshine levels), sentiment does (it can be reflected 
through e.g. consumer confidence indices, IPOs’ first-day returns and trading volume).   
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and Pardo, 2004), religious celebrations (Białkowki et al., 2012), sports events (Edmans et al., 
2007), aviation disasters (Kaplansky and Levy, 2010) and terrorist attacks (Brounen and 
Derwal, 2010), research has denoted that events/situations with positive (negative) emotional 
content are associated with positive (negative) average equity returns. Recent research has also 
examined the role of mood in institutional investors’ trades, without the evidence produced 
appearing conclusive; Goetzmann et al. (2015) found cloud cover to affect US fund managers’ 
equity valuations and trade-direction (more (less) cloud cover increased (decreased) their 
perceived overpricing of stocks and prompted them to buy less (more)), while Kaustia and 
Rantapuska (2016) reported weak effects of various weather-related mood proxies over Finnish 
funds’ trades.6  
 
2.3 Mood and herding 
Whereas the above mentioned (section 2.1) intentional and spurious herding factors are rational 
in nature and their role in institutional herding has been widely investigated (see the survey 
evidence in Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003 and Spyrou, 2013), little is known about the role of 
less-than-perfectly rational factors in this regard.7 To that end, in this section we shall delineate 
the context of the relationship between mood and herding, in order to provide our study with a 
theoretical foundation. The key starting point here is that investment decisions entail high 
complexity and uncertainty and, as such, merit the substantial commitment of resources, 
including time and cognitive deliberation (Lucey and Dowling, 2005). However, deliberation 
on a topic is forced to compete for mental resources and attention with other tasks that need to 
                                                            
6 Kaustia and Rantapuska (2016) also report weak weather-related mood effects over Finnish retail investors’ 
trades. Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) find that cloud cover does not affect US retail investors’ trades, while 
Schmittmann et al. (2015) show that German retail investors buy (trade) more when the weather is good (bad).  
7 With the exception of a few studies exploring the role of culture (Beckmann et al., 2008) and sentiment (Liao et 
al., 2011; Celiker et al., 2015) on institutional herding, we are aware of no other studies investigating the role of 
such factors over the propensity of fund managers to herd. 
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be cognitively processed, thus ending up being neurologically taxing for the brain (Ardalan, 
2018). This raises issues regarding the costs and benefits of deliberation, the result being that, 
when faced with several options, humans are likely to end up choosing a “satisficing” one (e.g. 
the least costly option) rather than the optimal one (Lucey and Dowling, 2005).  
It is in this context of satisficing that mood enters investment decision-making; as Forgas 
(1995) has illustrated, the more (less) complex a decision is, the greater (lesser) the influence 
of feelings on it would be expected to be. This is of key relevance to investment decisions, 
considering their innate uncertainties and was further expounded by Loewenstein et al. (2001), 
whose “risk-as-feelings” model showcased that cognitive decisions involving risk and 
uncertainty are both motivated by and culminate into emotional responses. An issue arising in 
this context pertains to identifying the origins of those emotions and the relevant literature has 
come up with two possibilities in this respect. On the one hand, we have emotions exogenous 
(originating in environmental factors, such as weather, temperature and social interaction) to 
the decision-making process that affect judgement by prompting mood effects on 
fundamentally irrelevant decisions (e.g. the case where individuals’ perceptions of their life-
satisfaction are influenced by whether the weather at the time of their questioning is sunny or 
overcast; Schwarz and Clore, 1983). In this case, affective states are misattributed for 
information in the decision-making process (they nudge individuals towards reaching a 
decision based on how they feel about it) and this has come to be known as mood-misattribution 
(see e.g. Goetzmann et al., 2015). On the other hand, emotions may well hail from factors 
endogenous to the decision-making process itself, such as for example the image of a decision’s 
underlying object (e.g. a stock or a sector; Taffler, 2018).  
Whatever the source of emotions may be, the mood infused by them leads individuals to – 
temporarily – suspend rational processing in their cognitive evaluations, in effect increasing 
the likelihood of heuristics dominating decision-making and this is where the foundations for 
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the mood-herding link lie. Since herding constitutes a heuristic in itself8 and given that it grows 
stronger under conditions of uncertainty9 (when one would expect emotions to exert 
considerable influence), it is entirely plausible to assume that herding can be unconsciously 
encouraged by the prevailing mood among investors.10 This is particularly expected to be the 
case in the presence of positive mood, which has been found (Schwarz, 1990; Forgas, 1998) to 
reduce the perception of risk in decisions (hence, decrease risk-aversion) and render the 
employment of heuristics more likely in their processing. Evidence in support of herding during 
positive mood periods has been furnished regarding positive mood hailing both from 
exogenous (environmental) factors (the case of the Ramadan-celebration; Gavriilidis et al., 
201611) as well as endogenous ones (the case, for example, of the Dot Com bubble).12 However, 
although negative mood is assumed to prompt investors to view decisions as riskier than they 
actually are (hence, increase risk-aversion) and resort to more analytical processing (Schwarz, 
1990), this does not necessarily suggest the absence of heuristics under negative affective 
states. This is because any analytical decision-making will inevitably involve deliberation 
costs, which, beyond a certain threshold, will prompt the individual to switch to heuristics to 
automate the cognitive evaluation. Therefore, it is not unlikely that, in the presence of negative 
mood, investors will choose to herd with their peers, if the complexity of a decision renders 
deliberating on it prohibitively expensive. This is expected to be further enhanced via the risk-
aversion and loss-avoidance typifying periods of negative affective content. If, for instance, 
progressively worsening market conditions (e.g. an evolving crisis) amplify negative mood in 
                                                            
8 This is the case particularly with intentional herding, whereby investors faced with e.g. an informational problem 
choose to mimic their better-informed peers rather than attempt to tackle it themselves. 
9 Evidence, for example, suggests that investors herd the strongest when their investments are of high-risk, such 
as stocks of small capitalization (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004) or stocks from 
emerging/frontier markets (Economou et al., 2015; Guney et al., 2017). 
10 This is the case of social mood promoting herding via social interactions among investors, a possibility that was 
explored in earlier research (Olson 2006). 
11 The authors showed that market herding in majority Muslim stock exchanges was stronger during, compared 
to outside, Ramadan. 




the market, it is more likely that investors will unload their positions in tandem with their peers 
to curtail their losses, rather than invest time on analysing the causes, effects and likely duration 
of the crisis.   
The above discussion denotes that herding can interact significantly with mood and be 
motivated by both positive and negative affective states, with its presence expected to be more 
pronounced during positive mood periods (as it is those that foster heuristic-based assessments 
in decision-making). Although our study investigates herding among fund managers, who are 
presumed to be sophisticated and rational and who, as a result, would be assumed to be in no 
need of imitating their peers, the notably extensive literature on institutional trading suggests 
that herding among them is both present and of high magnitude.13 It follows, therefore, that the 
possibility of their herding accommodating mood-effects cannot be precluded, more so in view 
of the mixed recent evidence (Goetzmann et al., 2015; Kaustia and Rantapuska, 2016) on 
mood-effects over institutional trades. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
We test empirically for the effect of mood over institutional herding on the premises of a unique 
data set entailing the daily portfolio holdings of all “Type A” Turkish funds active during the 
period between January 2nd, 2002 and August 14th, 2008.14 Funds formally designated as “Type 
A” are required by law to invest at least 25% of their portfolio assets in domestic equities (with 
                                                            
13 For more on this, see Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2009), Choi and Skiba (2015) and Jiang and Verardo (2018). 
14 No daily data on Turkish funds’ portfolio holdings was available outside that window. 
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funds not subject to said requirement designated as “Type B”15).16 The database was obtained 
from the Capital Markets Board of Turkey and includes information on the: code and name of 
each fund; code and name of each asset in each fund’s portfolio; end-of-day number of units, 
price and market value (all expressed in Turkish Lira) of each asset held. The advantage of 
using daily portfolio holdings to test whether funds herd due to mood effects rests on the fact 
that mood is a short term phenomenon (Frijda, 1993) and using daily funds’ data enables us to 
better track any effects of mood changes over their herding.  
As the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 illustrate, our sample comprises of all 134 
“Type A” funds active at any point during our sample period, a fact which allows our sample 
to be free from survivorship bias; these funds invested in a total of 419 domestic stocks 
throughout that period. Of those 134 funds, 35 are equity funds, 21 are balanced/mixed funds, 
64 are variable funds17 and 14 are index funds. The average number of active stocks per day 
traded by at least one fund is 75 (or approximately 18% of the total number of stocks our sample 
funds invested in during the sample period), with the average number of active funds per stock 
per day being 3. When looking at the corresponding figures for stocks traded by at least 2, 3 
and 4 funds, we notice that the average number of stocks per day actively traded by funds falls 
substantially (reaching only 23 stocks for stocks traded by at least 4 funds), while the average 
number of active funds per stock per day for stocks traded by at least 4 funds is 7. Overall, 
these figures indicate a rather concentrated daily equity trading activity on behalf of “Type A” 
funds in the Turkish stock market that clearly has the potential of encouraging herding; with 3-
                                                            
15 “Type B” funds’ portfolios are dominated by fixed income instruments, such as bonds and repos.   
16 Both fund-types are open-ended; they are not allowed to hold more than 9% of the total shares outstanding of 
any company and are also not allowed to invest more than 10% of their net asset value in any company’s shares. 
17 Variable funds are funds which, aside from the 25%-threshold on equity investments pertaining to “Type A” 
funds mentioned above, are not subject to any further restrictions on their portfolio allocation.  
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7 funds, on average, being active per stock each day, this helps facilitate observation among 
them, thus rendering herding more feasible – and likely.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
To measure institutional herding – and later assess its relationship with mood – we employ the 
measure proposed by Sias (2004), which aims at extracting herding via the intertemporal 
dependence in the structure of institutional demand for stocks; more formally, institutional 
demand is proxied via the raw fraction of funds buying stock k in period (in our case, day) t 
(RawΔk,t), which is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡
                                                           (1) 
The total number of active funds in the denominator of Equation (1) is the sum of all funds that 
have either increased (“buyers”) or decreased (“sellers”) their position in stock k on day t 
compared to day t-1. 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t is then standardized by subtracting on each day from each stock’s 
𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t its cross sectional (across all active stocks on that day) mean (RawΔt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and dividing it 
by its cross sectional standard deviation (σ(RawΔk,t)): 
Δk,t =  
RawΔk,t- RawΔt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
σ(RawΔk,t)
                                                                                                               (2) 
To assess the temporal dependence of institutional demand, Sias (2004) proposed a first order 
autoregressive structure for Δk,t, as follows: 
Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t                                                                                         (3) 
With both sides of Equation (3) being standardized (and since Δk,t−1 is its sole independent 
variable), its slope (𝛽𝑡) represents the cross sectional correlation of institutional demand 
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In the above equation, the first additive component represents the part of the slope due to funds 
following their own lagged trades and the second one the part of the slope due to funds 
following the lagged trades of other funds (herding). Positive (negative) values for the first 
component would suggest that funds trade on day t in (against) the direction of their trades in 
day t-1; positive (negative) values for the second component would indicate that funds on day 
t trade toward (away from) other funds’ trades of day t-1. From the perspective of notation, Nk,t 
is the total number of active funds in stock k on day t, Dn,k,t is a dummy variable assuming the 
value of unity (zero) if fund n increases (decreases) its position in stock k on day t and Dm,k,t-1 
is a dummy variable assuming the value of unity (zero) when fund m (m≠n) increases 
(decreases) its position in stock k on day t-1. 
Since we investigate the effect of mood not only over institutional herding presence but also 
its direction, we account for the latter by partitioning our sample stocks each day into two 
groups (see Holmes et al., 2013), a buy-herd (comprised of stocks predominantly bought, i.e. 
whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5) and a sell-herd (comprised of stocks predominantly sold, i.e. whose 
𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5) one and estimate the Sias (2004) measure for each. 
We investigate the relationship between mood and institutional herding by assessing the 
interactions of the latter with four mood-proxies (weekend effect; holidays; Ramadan; 
sunshine) which have been established as such in the literature and we shall now briefly discuss 
the mood effects associated with each.  
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Weekend effect: this is one of the oldest documented effects in finance (see, for example, the 
discussion in Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988) and refers to stock returns being, on average, 
negative on Mondays and rising as one moves from Tuesday to Friday (with Friday’s returns 
being the highest of the week). Despite the wealth of rational explanations proposed to account 
for it, a significant number of studies have attributed the effect to investors’ mood being 
negative on Mondays (“Monday Blues”)18 and the most positive on Fridays.19 With respect, 
specifically, to institutional investors, who constitute the focus of our study, evidence on the 
connection of their trades to the weekend effect is rather mixed (see the discussion in Morse et 
al., 2014). We test empirically for the weekend effect by partitioning 𝛽t and its two components 
(funds following their own trades; funds following the trades of other funds) into two groups 
corresponding to Mondays and Fridays, respectively.  
Holiday effect: empirical research (see Meneu and Pardo, 2004 for a comprehensive review) 
has shown that pre holiday returns are significantly positive and account for a considerable 
portion of each year’s total rate of return, with post holiday returns having been found to be 
insignificantly different from average ordinary day returns. Considering that holidays allow 
individuals the opportunity for relaxation via distraction from their daily routine and are 
associated with a sense of euphoria (Lahav et al, 2016), it has been suggested (Fabozzi et al, 
1994) that the abnormally high pre holiday returns are motivated by investors’ positive mood 
prior to a holiday. The holiday effect is similar to the weekend effect, since both involve a 
trading break (weekend; holiday), with people’s mood being positive in anticipation of it on its 
eve (Friday; pre holiday) and reversing (Monday) or dissipating (post holiday) on the day 
following it. We test empirically for the holiday effect by first identifying the major national 
                                                            
18 “Monday-Blues” here refer to the negative mood induced on Mondays due to the change in sleep patterns 
between the weekend and Monday (Kramer, 2001). 
19 For a review of research on rational and mood-related explanations of the weekend effect see Birru (2016). 
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and religious holidays of the Republic of Turkey20 and then partitioning 𝛽t and its two 
components (funds following their own trades; funds following the trades of other funds) into 
two groups corresponding to pre holiday and post holiday days, respectively. 
Ramadan: it is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, central to which is the requirement for 
Muslims to engage in prayers, fast during day light and refrain from smoking and sensual 
pleasures (Białkowski et al., 2012). Ramadan’s atmosphere is characterized by spiritual elation 
and positive mood (Gavriilidis et al., 2016), culminating in a common euphoric state of 
religion-induced experience to which individuals in majority Muslim countries are collectively 
subject. This, in turn, promotes relative homogeneity of an emotional content in society 
(Gavriilidis et al., 2016), which, coupled with the enhanced social interaction levels observed 
during that month (Białkowski et al., 2012), increase the potential for commonality in 
behaviour. We test for the relationship between Ramadan and institutional herding by first 
identifying (based on the approach of Białkowski et al., 2012) the Ramadan months during our 
sample period (2/1/2002 – 14/8/2008) and then partitioning 𝛽t and its two components (funds 
following their own trades; funds following the trades of other funds) into two groups 
corresponding to within and outside Ramadan, respectively. 
Sunshine: a large volume of research (see Goetzmann et al., 2015 for an overview) has 
confirmed the effect of sunshine over mood and the effect’s implications for medical science; 
all in all, sunshine has been found to boost mood, whereas overcast weather tends to dampen 
it. In the financial context, research to date has investigated the effect of sunshine over equity 
returns (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003), risk tolerance (Bassi et al., 2013) 
and investors’ trading behaviour (Goetzmann and Zhu, 2005; Goetzmann et al., 2015; 
Schmittmann et al., 2015; Kaustia and Rantapuska, 2016). Although the evidence presented is 
                                                            
20 These are: New Year (January 1st), Children’s Day (April 23rd), Labour Day (May 1st), Youth and Sports Day 
(May 19th), Victory Day (August 30th), Republic Day (October 29th), Kurban Bayrami and Ramazan Bayrami.  
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not necessarily consistent, sunshine, generally, tends to be associated with positive returns in 
equity markets and a stronger buy-propensity on behalf of investors. We test empirically for 
the relationship between sunshine and institutional herding presence/direction in our study by 
identifying the hours of sunshine every day during our sample period (2/1/2002 – 14/8/2008) 
utilizing data from the Turkish State Meteorological Service;21 we then partition 𝛽t and its two 
components (funds following their own trades; funds following the trades of other funds) into 
two groups corresponding to days of increased and days of decreased sunshine, respectively, 
contingent on whether day t entails more or fewer hours of sunshine compared to day t-1. 
We now turn to discuss our theoretical expectations regarding first the relationship between 
institutional herding presence and mood, based on the above mentioned four mood-proxies. 
The discussion in section 2.3 showcased how herding can be motivated via both positive and 
negative mood; to the extent that positive mood reduces risk-aversion and fosters the 
employment of heuristics in decision-making, fund managers could rely on herding (a heuristic 
per se) more strongly during periods with positive affective content. However, herding could 
also manifest itself when mood is negative, as a response towards the greater risk aversion 
(seeking “safety in numbers”) induced by negative mood.22 The above suggest that a clear 
relationship between institutional herding presence and the weekend/holiday/sunshine effects 
is far from straightforward, since each of those mood-proxies accommodates the potential for 
both positive (Fridays; pre-holiday day; increased sunshine) and negative (Mondays; post-
holiday day; decreased sunshine) mood. With respect to Ramadan, the emotional homogeneity 
it fosters would be expected to enhance the relative homogeneity among fund managers as a 
group, thus increasing the likelihood of them engaging in stronger herding during Ramadan 
                                                            
21 http://mgm.gov.tr 
22 With negative mood leading individuals to perceive bad outcomes as more likely (Wright and Bower, 1992), it 
is possible that it can prompt, for example, “bad” fund managers to view their low skills as lower than they actually 
are, leading them to copy their better peers more intensively.  
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compared to the rest of the year’s months. In view of the above, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H1,0: Herding is expected to be stronger on positive mood days. 
H1,1: Herding is expected to be stronger on negative mood days. 
H2: Herding is expected to be stronger within, than outside, Ramadan.  
As regards our expectations on the relationship between mood and institutional herding 
direction, we would expect to witness stronger buy- (sell-) herding on Fridays, pre holiday days 
and increased sunshine days (Mondays, post holiday days and decreased sunshine days) which 
are associated with positive (negative) mood, in view of the fact that positive (negative) mood 
encourages purchases (sales) of stocks (see e.g. Goetzmann et al., 2015). In the same vein, we 
would also expect buy- (sell-) herding to be stronger than sell- (buy-) herding on Fridays, pre 
holiday days and increased sunshine days (Mondays, post holiday days and decreased sunshine 
days). With respect to Ramadan, given its positive mood content, one would expect 
institutional herding during that month to be strongly buy-side driven, compared to the rest of 
the year’s months and also buy-herding to be stronger than sell-herding during Ramadan. In 
view of the above, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H3: Buy-herding is expected to be stronger on positive mood days compared to negative mood 
days. 
H4: Buy-herding is expected to be stronger than sell-herding on positive mood days. 
H5: Sell-herding is expected to be stronger on negative mood days compared to positive mood 
ones. 
H6: Sell-herding is expected to be stronger than buy-herding on negative mood days. 
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H7: Buy-herding is expected to be stronger within, than outside, Ramadan.   
H8: Buy-herding is expected to be stronger than sell-herding within Ramadan.  
 
4. Results – Discussion 
4.1 Unconditional herding results 
We begin the presentation of our results with the estimates from Equation (3) and the 
concomitant decomposition of 𝛽t into its two components (funds following their own trades; 
funds following the trades of other funds) as per Equation (4) for the full sample period; results 
are presented in Table 2, Panel A for stocks traded by at least one, two, three or four funds. 
The employment of those four thresholds is appropriate here in view of the low average daily 
number (three) of active funds per stock, thus allowing us to assess whether our findings are 
robust to different levels of institutional equity trading activity. The results outlined in Table 
2, Panel A suggest that Turkish funds’ equity demand is characterized by significant temporal 
dependence, as evidenced through the significantly23 positive 𝛽t values. The latter exhibit a 
declining trend as the number of active funds per stock increases (from 0.0631 for the ≥1 funds’ 
threshold to 0.0471 for the ≥4 funds’ threshold)24, thus suggesting that the day-on-day cross 
correlation of Turkish institutional demand is around 4.7-6.3%. A closer inspection of 𝛽t ’s two 
components reveals interesting patterns; whereas the “funds following their own trades” part 
is significantly positive (denoting that funds follow their own lagged trades) for the ≥1 funds’ 
threshold, it turns significantly negative (denoting that funds trade against the direction of their 
own lagged trades) for the rest three thresholds, with that part’s value being the most negative 
                                                            
23 Any reference to statistical significance from now on will pertain to estimates with p-values less than 0.1.  
24 The ≥3 funds’ threshold presents us with a marginally lower 𝛽t value (0.0469) than the ≥4 funds’ threshold; 
however, both thresholds’ 𝛽t values are well below those of the ≥1 and ≥2 funds’ thresholds.  
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for the ≥4 funds’ threshold. On the other hand, the “funds following the trades of other funds” 
component is always significantly positive (indicative of significant herding), with its value 
rising (and from the ≥2 funds’ threshold onward, exceeding the 𝛽t value) as we move toward 
the ≥4 funds’ threshold. Overall, the evidence suggests the prevalence of herd behaviour among 
Turkish fund managers, with its magnitude rising as the average daily number of active funds 
per stock rises. 
To assess whether herding varies contingent on its direction (buy; sell), we re-estimate 
Equation (3) and decompose 𝛽t into its two components for predominantly bought (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t 
>0.5) and predominantly sold (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5) stocks, with results presented in Table 2, Panels 
B and C, respectively. 𝛽t is always significantly positive for sell-herds and significantly 
positive for the first two thresholds’ estimations for buy-herds. Both 𝛽t components are mostly 
significant; the “funds following their own trades” (“funds following the trades of other funds”) 
component is almost always negative (positive), with its values being almost always smaller 
(larger) for the buy compared to the sell herd and almost always substantially smaller (larger) 
compared to its corresponding values per threshold in Panel A of Table 2. As a result, funds 
trade away from their lagged trades more (less) strongly and follow the lagged trades of other 
funds more (less) when trading stocks that are predominantly bought (sold). With the two 𝛽t 
components strongly countervailing each other, this leads 𝛽t to assume lower values in Panels 
B and C compared to Panel A, thus indicating that the temporal dependence of directional (buy; 
sell) institutional demand is less pronounced compared to that of total institutional demand. 
The results reported in Panels B and C show that Turkish funds exhibit stronger buy- than sell-
herding and it is possible that this is due to the asymmetry in complexity involved in a buy- 
compared to a sell-decision: when funds have to choose which stock/s to sell, they have to 
choose among the given number of stocks in their portfolio; by comparison, the decision to buy 
a stock is more taxing in terms of time, effort and attention, since it will involve choosing 
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among the universe of listed stocks. Herding in this case can function as a useful heuristic, 
since monitoring the investments of their peers can inform/facilitate the stock selection process 
for fund managers.  
To get a first impression of the interactions of institutional herding with our mood proxies, we 
pool the latter together in the following multivariate setting: 
𝛽t = α0 + α1Mondayt + α2Holidayt + α3Ramadant + α4Sunshinet + εt                   (5) 
In Equation (5), Mondayt is a dummy assuming the value of one on Mondays, zero otherwise; 
Holidayt  is a dummy assuming the value of one pre holiday, zero otherwise; Ramadant is a 
dummy assuming the value of one during Ramadan, zero otherwise; and Sunshinet is a dummy 
assuming the value of one on increased sunshine days, zero otherwise. We also estimate 
Equation (5) using each of 𝛽t’s two components as dependent variable in turn. Results are 
presented in Table 3 for all four thresholds and, overall, denote the very limited presence of 
statistically significant estimates (whose significance is always at the 10% level). These results 
indicate the absence of any significant relationship between institutional herding and mood and 
we now turn to testing the interactions of institutional herding with each of the four mood-
proxies individually in view of the hypotheses proposed in the previous section.25 
 
4.2 Conditional herding results 
Tables 4-7 present the estimates from Equation (3) on the 𝛽t and its two components for all 
four thresholds, when conditioning its estimation on each mood-proxy’s states for the full 
sample of stocks, the buy-herd and the sell-herd. With regards to the full sample of stocks 
                                                            
25 Similar results were discovered when estimating Equation (5) using 𝛽t and its two components from the buy- 
and sell-herds. Results are not reported here for brevity reasons and are available from the authors on request.    
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(Panel A in Tables 4-7), 𝛽t is mostly significantly positive, tending to assume larger values on 
Mondays, during Ramadan and on decreased sunshine days; on the other hand, it is consistently 
insignificant on pre/post holiday days (Table 5, Panel A). Regarding buy- and sell-herding 
(Panels B and C, respectively, in Tables 4-7), results overall indicate a much more limited 
significance for 𝛽t, with sell-herding estimates tending to exhibit relatively more significance 
than buy-herding ones. However, the differences of 𝛽t – estimates between different states of 
each mood-proxy are almost always insignificant, thus denoting that the temporal dependence 
of institutional demand is independent of mood-states. 
The “funds following their own trades” part exhibits similar patterns in Tables 4-7 to its 
unconditional estimates in Table 2; more specifically, its full-sample, buy-herd and sell-herd 
estimates tend to be positive for the ≥1 funds’ threshold and negative for the rest three 
thresholds. Although this suggests that the propensity of Turkish fund managers to trade against 
their previous trades rises with the number of funds active in a stock, no consistent pattern (be 
it of magnitude or significance) emerges for that component across various mood-states. With 
very few exceptions (mostly pertaining to some significant Friday-Monday differences in Table 
4), the differences in that component’s estimates between different mood-states are 
overwhelmingly insignificant, suggesting that whether Turkish fund managers follow their 
previous trades or not is not a function of the mood-state prevailing.  
We now turn to the “funds following the trades of other funds” part, which is of key interest 
here, as it reveals the herding tendencies of institutional investors and whether these vary with 
mood-states. To begin with, both Mondays and Fridays appear to entail significant herding for 
the full sample (Monday’s herding appearing stronger in most cases than Friday’s) in Table 4, 
Panel A, while Fridays tend to accommodate consistently significant sell-herding (Table 4, 
Panel C); sell-herding on Mondays is less significant, while neither day exhibits widespread 
evidence of buy-herding (Table 4, Panel B). The buy- (sell-) herding of Mondays (Fridays) 
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appears to be significantly stronger compared to that of Fridays’ (Mondays’) for the ≥3 and 4 
(2 and 3) funds’ thresholds, as the significant p-values of the relevant tests of difference 
suggest. When only the thresholds with jointly significant buy- and sell-herding estimates are 
considered (i.e. the ≥3 and 4 funds’ thresholds), we notice that buy- (sell-) herding is stronger 
than sell- (buy-) herding for Mondays (Fridays). As regards holidays, the “funds following the 
trades of other funds” part is significant on pre-holiday days only for some tests, without, 
however, its difference from its equivalent post-holidays days’ estimates being significant 
(Table 5).  
With respect to Ramadan, Turkish funds tend to herd more strongly within, compared to 
outside, that month, without the difference of those estimates within-versus-outside Ramadan 
being significant on any occasion (Table 6, panel A). There exists some very strong buy-
herding within-Ramadan for the ≥3 and 4 funds’ thresholds (Table 6, Panel B) which is larger 
in value than the outside-Ramadan buy-herding; although this is in line with theoretical 
expectations on the month’s positive mood prompting equity purchases, the difference of buy-
herding within-versus-outside Ramadan is insignificant for both thresholds. Non-Ramadan 
days are characterized by consistently significant sell-herding, while no evidence of the latter 
is reported for Ramadan, whatsoever; despite that, non-Ramadan sell-herding is found to be 
significantly different from Ramadan’s for the ≥1 funds’ threshold only (Table 6, Panel C). 
Interestingly enough, non-Ramadan sell-herding is smaller in magnitude than non-Ramadan’s 
buy-herding; taken together with the strong buy-herding reported in-Ramadan for the ≥3 and 4 
funds’ thresholds (and the absence of sell-herding during Ramadan; Table 6, Panel B), it 
indirectly confirms that Turkish fund managers herd more strongly on the buy- than the sell-
side (in line with the unconditional herding results from Table 2).26 
                                                            
26 Białkowski et al. (2013) argued that market returns in majority Muslim countries tend to rise after the three-and-a-half day 
celebration (known as Ramazan Bayrami in Turkey, a public holiday for which we have already accounted in our holiday 
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Decreased sunshine days tend to entail stronger herding (Table 7, Panel A), while buy-herding 
is stronger during increased sunshine days (Table 7, Panel B); the latter is in line with 
theoretical expectations, according to which fund managers would be expected to buy-herd 
more on days of positive mood. Evidence on sell-herding is rather mixed, as decreased sunshine 
days have stronger sell-herding for two thresholds (≥2 and 3 funds’ thresholds), while sell-
herding is present for the ≥4 funds’ threshold for increased sunshine days only (Table 7, Panel 
C). Again here, the differences between increased and decreased sunshine herding estimates 
are insignificant in all cases. Buy-herding tends to be stronger than sell-herding for increased 
sunshine days (see the ≥2, 3 and 4 funds’ thresholds), while decreased sunshine days 
demonstrate no clear buy-versus-sell herding pattern in that respect.    
Overall, the results outlined in Tables 4-7 suggest that institutional herding in Turkey enjoys 
no robust relationship with mood when accounting for various mood proxies. Although some 
herding patterns in line with expectations do occasionally arise (e.g. stronger buy-herding on 
increased sunshine days and during Ramadan), these are neither confirmed for all thresholds 
of funds’ equity trading activity tested for, nor are their differences with their complementary 
mood state’s herding (e.g. decreased sunshine days and non-Ramadan days) significant. As a 
result, our evidence supports none of the hypotheses we proposed in section 3.2 on the 
relationship of mood with both institutional herding presence and direction. 
A possible explanation for the absence of such a relationship is that fund managers are 
sophisticated investors, whose trading conduct is not subject to mood-effects; however 
plausible this may appear, it need not always hold, given the evidence from Goetzmann et al. 
(2015) on weather-effects on US institutional trades. Alternatively, the lack of a mood-herding 
                                                            
effect tests) following the Ramadan’s completion and proposed an alternative identification of the Ramadan-period with one 
including not only the Ramadan-month in itself, but also the seven days following the Ramazan Bayrami. We explored whether 
our results vary when using their definition of Ramadan, yet again found no significant difference in institutional herding in-
versus-outside Ramadan. Results are not presented here in the interest of brevity and are available upon request.  
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relationship may be due to mood-effects varying among investment professionals on the 
premises of their experience. It is possible, for instance, that more (less) experienced fund 
managers are less (more) subject to mood-effects, in line with the findings of Lo and Repin 
(2002) on longer-tenure derivatives’ traders exhibiting a reduced emotional footprint to market 
volatility compared to their shorter-tenure peers. If true, such effects would be expected to 
dissipate when averaged out across all fund managers – which is the case with this study (given 
the lack of data on Turkish managers’ experience-levels).  
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
The evidence presented so far suggests that mood does not affect the propensity of Turkish 
fund managers to herd, with their herding found to be insignificantly different across various 
mood states in almost all cases. As a first robustness test of our findings, we first remove the 
14 index funds of our data set from our sample and repeat all estimations from Tables 4-7. The 
reason for removing all index funds pertains to the fact that these funds are trackers in nature 
that rebalance their portfolios mechanically, aiming at replicating the composition and 
performance of the index they are benchmarked against. Including these funds in our 
estimations raises the possibility of our results being affected by the trades of funds motivated 
by passive investing and which, as a result, would not be expected to be related to mood per 
se. The estimates we obtain following the removal of those 14 funds from the sample are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4-7 and confirm the absence of any mood-
effects over Turkish fund managers’ herding.27 
                                                            
27 Results are not reported here for reasons of brevity and are available from the authors on request. 
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We then explore whether our results are driven by the size effect, a well-known determinant of 
institutional herding internationally (Andrikopoulos et al., 2017). To that end, we rank the 
universe of stocks that our sample funds have invested in each year into five quintiles (Q1 to 
Q5, with Q1 corresponding to the smallest and Q5 to the largest capitalization stocks) based 
on those stocks’ market capitalization28 at the end of the immediately preceding year and repeat 
all estimations from Tables 4-7. Results29 confirm, by and large, the original full-sample results 
on institutional herding being insignificantly different across various mood states, thus 
indicating the absence of any size effect in our estimates. Moreover, the “funds following the 
trades of other funds” consistently assumes its lowest value for quintile 1, suggesting that 
Turkish fund managers herd the least in stocks of the smallest capitalization, irrespective of the 
mood state tested. A possible reason for this is that the relatively lower volumes typifying small 
stocks reduce the feasibility of herding by leading to delays in order-execution, thus rendering 
it more difficult for investors wishing to herd (indeed, to engage in any trading strategy) to do 
so uninhibitedly (Andrikopoulos et al., 2017).   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we empirically assess the relationship between mood and institutional investors’ 
herding for the first time in the literature. Drawing on the daily portfolio holdings of Turkish 
funds, we study this relationship on the premises of a series of established mood proxies, 
including the weekend effect, the holiday effect, Ramadan and sunshine. Overall, fund 
managers in Turkey herd significantly, with their herding growing in magnitude as the number 
of active funds per stock rises and appearing stronger on the buy- than the sell-side. Regarding 
                                                            
28 Data on our sample stocks’ market capitalization was obtained from the Thomson Reuters Data Stream database. 
29 Results are not reported here for brevity reasons and are available from the authors on request.  
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the relationship of mood with institutional herding, it occasionally assumes the correct sign as 
per theoretical expectations; however, institutional herding is found to be insignificantly 
different across various mood states, thus showcasing that the propensity of fund managers to 
herd is not subject to the impact of mood. These results further indicate that the pursuit of a 
behavioural trading pattern by institutional investors does not necessarily render them mood-
prone in their trading conduct (more so given their sophisticated nature) and contribute to the 
debate on the role of less-than-perfectly rational factors over investors’ herding, in general.  
The evidence presented in our paper is of particular interest to researchers, since the lack of a 
significant effect of mood over institutional herding documented here raises the question of 
whether this holds internationally across markets with differences in their size, financial 
development, institutional design and asset management industry structure. Given the mixed 
extant evidence (Goetzmann et al., 2015; Kaustia and Rantapuska, 2016) on the role of 
weather-related mood proxies over institutional trading behaviour, it is not unlikely that the 
effect of mood over institutional herding may vary internationally. An issue arising is whether 
mood-factors commonly affecting some markets (such as Ramadan in majority Muslim 
markets) produce similar effects over these markets’ institutional herding. Our findings are also 
of interest to practitioners keen on exploiting potential market inefficiencies, since a significant 
relationship of institutional herding in a market with a mood-factor could be used to inform 
their trading strategies. If, for example, institutional herding interacts significantly with a 
weather-variable (e.g. rain or temperature) an investor can rely on rain/temperature forecasts 
to trade in/against the anticipated direction of institutional herding while also employing 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Number of stocks 419 
Number of funds 134 
Number of day-holding positions 2,626,370 
# funds Average number of active stocks per day traded by Average number of active funds per stock per day for stocks traded by 
≥1 fund 74.6 3.2 
≥2 funds 43.9 4.7 
≥3 funds 30.8 5.8 
≥4 funds 23.0 6.7 
 The table presents descriptive statistics on the data set of daily portfolio holdings of “Type A” Turkish funds for the 2/1/2002 – 14/8/2008 period obtained from 
the Capital Markets Board of Turkey. We report the average number of stocks traded by at least 1/2/3/4 funds every day; we also report the average number of 




Table 2: Tests for herding presence– Buyer if increased position  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient  
Average coefficient (βt) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the trades of 
other funds 
Average R² 
Panel A: Unconditional herding  
































Panel B: Tests for herding direction– buy herding  
































Panel C: Tests for herding direction– sell herding  
































This table reports the estimates from the equation: Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t  for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), for stocks predominantly 
bought (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5; Panel B) and for stocks predominantly sold (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5; Panel C). For each 
security and day between 02/01/2002 and 14/08/2008 we calculate the fraction of funds that increase their position in the security. A fund is 
defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of day t than it held at the end of day t-1. All data 
are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each day. We then estimate daily cross sectional regressions of institutional demand 
on lagged institutional demand for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), stocks predominantly bought (Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold 
(Panel C). Because Δk,t−1 is the sole independent variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are 






Table 3: Multivariate regression on the effect of mood proxies over institutional herding 




Dependent variable:  
 “Funds following their own trades” 
Dependent variable:  
 “Funds following the trades of other funds” 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1 






























R2 0.0031 0.0020 0.0015 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 






























R2 0.0025 0.0018 0.0010 
Panel C: No of active funds per stock ≥ 3 






























R2 0.0019 0.0029 0.0005 
Panel D: No of active funds per stock ≥ 4 






























R2 0.0045 0.0013 0.0016 
The table presents the estimates from the following multivariate regression: 𝛽t = α0 + α1Mondayt + α2Holidayt + α3Ramadant + α4Sunshinet 
+ εt. Mondayt is a dummy assuming the value of one on Mondays, zero otherwise; Holidayt is a dummy assuming the value of one pre holiday, 
zero otherwise; Ramadant is a dummy assuming the value of one during Ramadan, zero otherwise; and Sunshinet is a dummy assuming the 
value of one on increasing sunshine days, zero otherwise. The regressand in each of the three regressions is βt, “Funds following their own 












Table 4: Tests for herding presence–herding and the weekend effect  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient  
Average coefficient (βt) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the trades of 
other funds 
Average R² 
Friday Monday Friday Monday Friday Monday Friday Monday 
Panel A: Unconditional herding and the weekend effect  














0.7101             0.2698 0.3572  














0.4669             0.9384 0.4843  














0.8948             0.1089 0.1781  














0.1753            0.5939 0.1266  
Panel B: Tests for herding direction–buy herding and the weekend effect  














0.2338 0.8504 0.5027   














0.7712 0.7705 0.7434   














0.4358 0.1285 0.0974   














0.8573 0.0231 0.0234   
Panel C: Tests for herding direction–sell herding and the weekend effect  














0.5128 0.1541 0.2899   














0.2560 0.0275 0.0140   














0.9473 0.0738 0.0960   














0.6748 0.2463 0.2869   
This table reports the estimates from the equation: Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t for Mondays and Fridays for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), for 
stocks predominantly bought (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5; Panel B) and for stocks predominantly sold (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t 
<0.5; Panel C). For each security and day between January, 2nd 2002 and August 14th, 2008 we calculate the fraction of funds that increase 
their position in the security. A fund is defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of day t 
than it held at the end of day t-1. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each day for Mondays and Fridays. We 
then estimate daily cross sectional regressions of institutional demand on lagged institutional demand once for Mondays and once for Fridays 
only for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), stocks predominantly bought (Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold (Panel C). Because Δk,t−1 
is the sole independent variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross sectional 
correlations between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand for that sample on Mondays and Fridays, respectively. The first 
column reports the time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) for each of the two days. The 
second and third columns report the portion of the correlation resulting from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion resulting 
from funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding) for each of the two days. P-values of Wald test-statistics of difference 




Table 5: Tests for herding presence–herding and the holiday effect  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient  
Average coefficient (βt) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the trades of 
other funds 
Average R² 





Pre holiday Post holiday Pre holiday Post holiday 
Panel A: Unconditional herding and the holiday effect 














0.6191              0.9983 0.6093  














0.6817              0.3237 0.2201  














0.5809              0.1854 0.1643  














0.9158             0.1315 0.3487  
Panel B: Tests for herding presence–buy herding and the holiday effect  














0.4872            0.8963 0.6500  














0.1051            0.4593 0.1785  














0.9963            0.5059 0.5375  














0.9899            0.3962 0.4019  
Panel C: Tests for herding presence–sell herding and the holiday effect  














0.7941           0.3164 0.2857  














0.2032            0.6742 0.5410  














0.8241            0.5393 0.5205  














0.0888            0.6530 0.4737  
This table reports the estimates from the equation: Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t for pre and post holiday days (defined as the day immediately 
preceding and the day immediately after a holiday, respectively) for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), for stocks predominantly bought (i.e. 
for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5; Panel B) and for stocks predominantly sold (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5; Panel C). For each security 
and day between January, 2nd 2002 and August 14th, 2008 we calculate the fraction of funds that increase their position in the security. A fund 
is defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of day t than it held at the end of day t-1. All 
data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each day for pre and post holiday days. We then estimate daily cross sectional 
regressions of institutional demand on lagged institutional demand once for the pre holiday and once for the post holiday days only for the full 
sample of stocks (Panel A), stocks predominantly bought (Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold (Panel C). Because Δk,t−1 is the sole 
independent variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross sectional correlations 
between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand for that sample pre and post holiday, respectively. The first column reports the 
time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) pre and post holiday. The second and third 
columns report the portion of the correlation resulting from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion resulting from funds 
following the previous trades of other funds (herding) for each of the two days. P-values of Wald test-statistics of difference between pre and 




Table 6: Tests for herding presence–herding and the Ramadan effect  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient  
Average coefficient (βt) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the trades of 
other funds 
Average R² 









Panel A: Unconditional herding and the Ramadan effect  














0.4042            0.1495 0.3284  














0.0790           0.4531 0.3402  














0.3480           0.6349 0.6015  














0.1065           0.6731 0.1542  
Panel B: Tests for herding presence–buy herding and the Ramadan effect  














0.2934          0.1252 0.3041  














0.0188          0.7043 0.5883  














0.3667          0.7806 0.9863  














0.1613           0.4550 0.2940  
Panel C: Tests for herding presence–sell herding and the Ramadan effect  














0.8843          0.0471 0.0512  














0.4930          0.3344 0.4140  














0.9676          0.4366 0.4450  














0.2633          0.1763 0.1694  
This table reports the estimates from the equation: Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t within and outside the month of Ramadan for the full sample of stocks 
(Panel A), for stocks predominantly bought (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5; Panel B) and for stocks predominantly sold (i.e. for stocks 
whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5; Panel C). For each security and day between January, 2
nd 2002 and August 14th, 2008 we calculate the fraction of funds 
that increase their position in the security. A fund is defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the 
end of day t than it held at the end of day t-1. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each day within and outside 
Ramadan. We then estimate daily cross sectional regressions of institutional demand on lagged institutional demand within and outside 
Ramadan for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), stocks predominantly bought (Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold (Panel C). Because 
Δk,t−1 is the sole independent variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross sectional 
correlations between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand within and outside Ramadan, respectively. The first column reports 
the time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) within and outside Ramadan. The second 
and third columns report the portion of the correlation resulting from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion resulting from 
funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding) within and outside Ramadan. P-values of Wald test-statistics of difference between 





Table 7: Tests for herding presence–herding and the sunshine effect  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient  
Average coefficient (βt) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the trades of 
other funds 
Average R² 













Panel A: Unconditional herding and the sunshine effect 














0.5839              0.9638 0.6126  














0.1260             0.1107 0.9338  














0.2978            0.2347 0.9823  














0.2852           0.4604 0.6474  
Panel B: Tests for herding presence–buy herding and the sunshine effect  














0.5038          0.5590 0.7745  














0.4291         0.1692 0.1407  














0.4727        0.3894 0.4596  














0.6474        0.3913 0.5030  
Panel C: Tests for herding presence–sell herding and the sunshine effect  














0.7111       0.5800 0.4972  














0.8780      0.9309 0.9052  














0.5531     0.6783 0.5762  














0.2217    0.2927 0.3280  
This table reports the estimates from the equation: Δk,t = βtΔk,t-1 + εk,t during days of increased and decreased sunshine (having first identified 
the sunshine hours per day drawing on data obtained from the Turkish State Meteorological Service) for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), 
stocks predominantly bought (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t >0.5; Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold (i.e. for stocks whose 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝛥k,t <0.5; 
Panel C). For each security and day between January, 2nd 2002 and August 14th, 2008 we calculate the fraction of funds that increase their 
position in the security. A fund is defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of day t than it 
held at the end of day t-1. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each day for increased/decreased sunshine days. 
We then estimate daily cross sectional regressions of institutional demand on lagged institutional demand for increased and decreased sunshine 
days for the full sample of stocks (Panel A), stocks predominantly bought (Panel B) and stocks predominantly sold (Panel C). Because Δk,t−1 
is the sole independent variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross sectional 
correlations between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand for increased and decreased sunshine days, respectively. The first 
column reports the time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) for increased and decreased 
sunshine days. The second and third columns report the portion of the correlation resulting from funds following their own lagged trades and 
the portion resulting from funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding) for increased and decreased sunshine days. P-values of 
Wald test-statistics of difference between increased and decreased sunshine days’ estimates are included underneath each pair of estimates. 
 
